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ABSTRACT 
 The effectiveness of a defense enterprise network can be directly related to that 
network’s consistent availability and resiliency against incidents resulting in the 
degradation of systems and services. The 2012 Department of Defense’s (DOD) 
Information Enterprise Architecture version 2.0 reinforced this concept by identifying 
that enterprise-wide access to network services and network optimization were two of the 
most vital aspects of an effective enterprise network. Additionally, the 2017 National 
Security Strategy (NSS) identified the requirement to improve the resiliency of federal 
enterprise networks. The NSS recognized that the DOD must utilize the private sector’s 
latest applications and techniques to improve the DOD’s ability to provide uninterrupted 
secure network services. Lichtenthaler’s 2018 qualitative study in Journal of Strategy and 
Management concluded that many of the world’s most innovative companies resided in 
the United States. The DOD may stand to benefit by collaborating with U.S. private 
industry to identify network incident response tools, services, and operating procedures to 
accomplish the effective management, monitoring, and security of defense enterprise 
networks. The intellectual capacity of private industry must be leveraged through public 
and private cooperation to enhance the DOD’s ability to successfully respond to the 
multitude of adverse events that negatively impact defense enterprise networks. 
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I. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From the deep fight to rear area operations, there is little evidence to deny the 
importance information systems have in all aspects of military operations on the modern 
battlefield. Therefore, the ability to effectively manage critical information systems in 
garrison and abroad has become increasingly relevant within the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and its enterprise networks. If defense organizations are to guarantee near seamless 
availability of the enterprise networks that support the complete range of military 
operations, the implementation of new, innovative incident handling tools, services, and 
operating procedures must be a priority. Fortunately, the United States enjoys the benefit 
of being home to some of the most innovative and successful technology companies in the 
world. An analysis the U.S. private industry’s incident handling operations is the first of 
many steps needed in the DOD’s pursuit of enhancing network incident handling capability 
in support of the modern warfighter. 
1. Topic Overview 
The problems associated with incident handling operations are not new, nor are 
they simple by any means. An organization’s ability to prevent and respond to an outage 
or service degradation involves all business sectors and facets of the organization, from 
human resources to executive leadership. This diverse involvement and level of complexity 
means that there are unfortunately no practices that can be deemed “the best” when solving 
these problems. Industry, use case, size, and legal responsibility are just a few of the factors 
that can shape the policies and procedures an organization implements for its enterprise-
level network incident response. While the concept of a best practice is difficult to define 
given the complex socio-technical systems involved, there are practices and procedures 
that have deep and tangible commonality in all applications of network incident handling 
operations. These common threads that can be seen across industries provide a baseline 
from which organizations can then adjust the scope of their own needs and capabilities 
based on their individual use case. The goal of this research is to find those common threads 
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with the intention of increasing the agility and overall resilience of defense enterprise-level 
networks within the DOD.  
The difference between an enterprise and an organization in the context of this 
research is not well defined and can often result in confusion. For the purposes of clarity, 
an enterprise will reference a grouping based on a systems or network-level mindset as in 
the Marine Corps’ Enterprise Network (MCEN). Conversely, an organization is a logical 
concept of organization that can be larger than a given enterprise (such as the entire DOD), 
or subdivisions within a larger organization all serviced by a common enterprise (such as 
individual units all operating on the MCEN). Throughout this research, the relative scale 
of organizations referenced, and their associated enterprise environments, is not consistent, 
but is instead unique to the individual entity. For the most part, the recommendations and 
points of view expressed in this research are from the perspective of branch-level enterprise 
networks within the DOD, with the understanding that these enterprises serve many smaller 
organizations, each with their own missions, organization, and systems. The scale and 
relationship between the organizations and their enterprise networks and systems are 
important concepts to consider as the practices extoled for a given organization or 
enterprise may not be tenable for another.  
While the thought of closely examining organizational business practices with the 
intent of improvement may seem like an evaluative measure, this research is not an audit. 
The incident handling methods observed in this research, the metrics by which incident 
response is measured, and the efficacy of those methods and metrics are all self-identified 
by the individual participants. To attempt to hold each organization and its capabilities 
against a universal model of best practice is neither possible nor practical. Instead, this 
research should be used as a means to highlight the core of what constitutes state-of-the-
art technologies and practices at the time of writing. Changes in technology, advancements 
in business practices, and shifting philosophical paradigms that dictate how network 
incident handling operations are executed will continue to reshape the landscape of 
network incident response and security, potentially making a subset of the conclusions 
found within this research obsolete in the future. The researchers seek to achieve an 
understanding of what is being done at the time of research by those at the forefront of the 
3 
field. It is therefore vitally important that business executives, IT managers, policy makers, 
and leaders at every level continue to adhere to a maneuver warfare mindset by encouraging 
continued research and remaining knowledgeable in this changing domain.  
2. Participation Overview 
To ensure that the research included a diverse range of participants, the research 
sampling included organizations that varied in industry, size, and structure. On one end of 
the spectrum, participants included robust cloud service providers (CSP) and software as a 
service (SaaS) companies like Microsoft as well as members of the automotive and airline 
transportation industries. These larger organizations were, in many ways, representative of 
Defense Enterprise Networks in that each organization provided enterprise network 
services to thousands of customers. On the other end of the spectrum, participants included 
multiple tech startups and public universities. These organizations were included in the 
sample, recognizing that they too may be implementing security and incident handling 
tools, practices, and procedures relevant within DOD enterprise networks. The sample also 
included an array of U.S. federal government organizations and DOD enterprise networks, 
including input from two of the four largest enterprise networks in the DOD. As seen in 
Tables 1 and 2, the total number of participants was thirteen, including eight organizations 
from the private industry and academia and five from the federal government.  
Table 1. Participant Industry Breakdown 
Industry Represented Number of participants 
Government 5 
Service Providers / SaaS 3 
Academia 2 
Transportation 2 





Table 2. Participant Size Breakdown 
Organization Size Number of Participants 
Small (Up to 1,000 users) 2 
Medium (1,001 to 25,000 users) 4 
Large (More than 25,000 users) 7 
 
3. Research Methodology 
The research used a qualitative methods approach to examine both the federal 
government and private industry’s incident handling operations policies, procedures, and 
tools. The first phase of the analysis was a qualitative review of existing literature. The 
research focused on literature released over the last two decades by both the federal 
government and private industry. The two-decades timeframe was chosen for two reasons: 
(a) starting in the early 21st century, computer and information scientists began to review 
network-monitoring practices with intellectual rigor intent on establishing long-term 
solutions; and (b) the proliferation of technically advanced and geographically distributed 
networks over the last decade makes literature produced before this particular time period 
less relevant for the current operating environment. As a result, the literature review will 
use the year 2000 as a baseline for further research.  
The goal of Phase I analysis was to establish the baseline characteristics and 
concepts included in federal government security and incident handling policies, as well as 
the similarities and differences that exist between these U.S. federal policies and what was 
being implemented by private industry. After all concepts were consolidated, researchers 
conducted a comparative analysis to identify thematic trends that existed across the U.S. 
federal government and private industry models. Following the completion of the analysis, 
a 61-question questionnaire (see the appendix) was created that segmented operational 
domains within the incident-prevention and incident handling industry into four distinct 
categories: Policies, Methodologies, Structure, and Standards; Personnel, Training, and 
Network Operations Center Structure; Incident Identification Tools and Procedures; and 
Program Management Techniques. The questionnaire was created using the network 
incident handling operations industry standards identified by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) 800 series of special publications, emphasizing NIST’s 
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security (SP 800–53) and incident handling (SP 800–61) frameworks (Cichonski et al., 
2012).  
Phase II of the research included the examination of individual use-cases. This 
examination occurred in three different forms: on-site security and network operations 
center visits, virtual synchronous interviews, and asynchronous questionnaire completion. 
Whether conducted in-person or virtually, each method of evaluation leveraged the 
research questionnaire and analyzed the security and network incident handling tools, 
policies, processes, and procedures being used by each participant. Site visits were 
extremely thorough and included interviews with each individual section of an 
organization’s network operations model. These sections included network operations, 
incident handling, helpdesk activity, defensive cyber teams, security operations, and 
organizational leadership. During synchronous virtual interviews, the researchers 
coordinated with organizations to ensure that members from each relevant section of their 
respective incident handling operations were available for the interview. During 
asynchronous questionnaire completion, participants typically leveraged organizational 
wikis and other collaboration tools to ensure that the appropriate personnel were providing 
the input necessary to complete the questionnaire in a detailed and accurate manner. 
Phase III included a thematic analysis of all completed questionnaires. The data 
was analyzed for thematic outliers and inconsistencies that existed between U.S. private 
industry and federal government’s incident response operations. Researchers then created 
a model that separated data into the phases of the incident handling life cycle. NIST Special 
Publication 800–61 identified that incident handling teams execute operations in one of 
four stages: preparation; detection and analysis; containment, eradication, and recovery; 
and post-incident activity (see Figure 1). The researchers also added “Policy” as a fifth 
stage in the incident handling life cycle, recognizing incident handling policy as a pre-
requisite necessary to successfully execute all other stages. The fifth stage of the life cycle 
was added primarily due to the legal and organizational implications different policies had 
on incident handling methodology and decisions that were realized during the data analysis 
phase. By segmenting the data into the five phases of the incident handling life cycle, the 
researchers identified the frequency with which public and private organizations’ incident 
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handling methodology aligned with NIST recommendations within each individual stage. 
However, instead of creating a performance metric that simply measured this frequency, 
the researchers investigated the instances in which participants deviated from NIST 
recommendations, attempting to potentially identify a state-of-the-art practice or procedure 
not yet identified within U.S. federal policy.  
 
Figure 1. NIST Incident Handling Life Cycle and Policy Relationship. 
Adapted from Cichonski et al. (2012). 
4. Research Goals and Intent 
The analysis conducted in this research used NIST’s incident handling guide as a 
framework with the addition of an in-depth analysis of network and incident handling 
policy. The addition of this policy analysis was derived from the recognition of the 
importance organizational policy plays on all aspects of incident handling as outlined in 
NIST’s guide. The research will conclude with a list of recommendations pertaining to 
incident handling policy, procedures, and tools that may potentially enhance the agility and 
resilience of DOD enterprise networks, to include the MCEN. Recommendations will be 
formulated based on the frequency with which a particular practice or methodology was 
mentioned in the research sample, instances of procedural success that were self-identified 
by participants, capability short-falls expressed by participating organizations, and the 
current state of the art based on studies and techniques developed during past research 
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efforts. The most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) (2017) advocates for public and 
private cooperation to enhance the security of the nation’s critical infrastructure, including 
the government’s enterprise networks. This systematic review and thematic analysis of 
incident handling practices in both the federal government and U.S. private industries will 
focus on identifying the unique requirements and use-cases within the DOD to determine 
the applicability of the private industry’s most efficient incident response practices. The 
goal is to determine the applicability of these changes within the DOD’s enterprise 
operations communities. 
B. U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POLICY AND INCIDENT HANDLING 
FRAMEWORK 
In 2000, the White House recognized the strategic importance of the United States’ 
network infrastructure as it applied to federal government agencies’ ability to carry out the 
NSS. This realization led to the release of The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 
Circular no. A-130, Appendix III, which had two primary objectives: The first objective 
was to identify federal government information systems as a strategic resource; and the 
second, was to establish the capability to support network users when a security incident 
occurs (Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 2016). In 2002, two years after the 
release of the White House’s circular, Congress signed the Federal Information Security 
Modernization Act (FISMA) into law, officially mandating that federal government 
organizations implement policies and procedures for incident detection, reporting, and 
response (E-Government Act, 2002). Together, these two documents established the legal 
precedent for the implementation of federal government incident prevention and handling 
policies. 
1. The Origins of NIST’s Incident Handling Guide 
Within FISMA, NIST was explicitly tasked to establish security definitions, 
controls, and an incident handling framework that U.S. federal agencies would leverage 
when developing their cyber security (incident prevention) and incident handling policies. 
It is from here that the current iteration of the Federal Information Processing Standards 
(FIPS) and NIST 800-series Special Publications (SP-800) originate. The 800-series 
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Special Publications developed by NIST and their parent laws and directives make up an 
overarching policy and framework that systems critical to national security must follow. 
While organizations within the federal government have additional overlays, orders, and 
standard operating procedures that help to tailor incident handling policy to the needs of 
that individual organization, these additional policies must exist within the bounds of 
NIST’s framework, adding specificity and additional requirements specific to the systems 
and missions they address.  
The security and incident handling frameworks developed on behalf of the U.S. 
federal government by NIST, derive both their origin and authority from public policy and 
U.S. federal law. As such, the controls and standards outlined in these frameworks impose 
legal requirements on all systems deemed critical to national security. While other security 
and incident handling frameworks are being used successfully by organizations around the 
world, NIST’s incident handling framework is used throughout this research as a baseline 
because of the legal implications NIST’s framework has on National Security Systems. 
This chapter will briefly examine the origins and broad concepts outlined in NIST’s 
security and incident handling frameworks as they apply to DOD’s Enterprise Networks 
and the MCEN. The intent of this section is to present the lens through which this research 
was conducted, and the resulting recommendations are made. This lens specifically targets 
DOD organizations operating national security systems and their associated defense 
enterprise networks. However, the underlying concepts outlined below are in no way 
unique to NIST’s framework, and the recommendations presented in later sections can still 
be applied to organizations and enterprises that do not adhere to NIST publications directly. 
2. The NIST Incident Handling Life Cycle 
The NIST incident handling guide establishes that incident handling occurs in four 
distinct stages, as shown in Figure 1: 1) preparation, 2) detection and analysis, 3) 
containment, eradication, recovery, and 4) post-incident activity (Cichonski et al., 2012). 
In addition to the incident handling stages as defined by NIST, this research establishes 
policy as a stage zero because of the researcher’s assessment that organizations must 
implement incident handling policy to effectively execute all other stages within NIST’s 
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model, and the prevalence of policy adoption and implementation that was found during 
data collection. Following the development and implementation of policy, the preparation 
stage serves as an organization’s opportunity to identify the incident handling team 
structure most suitable for their use-case and train their incident handlers (Cichonski et al.). 
The preparation phase also focuses on preventing incidents by implementing controls that 
enhance enterprise systems, network, and applications security as referenced in NIST’s 
Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations, SP 800–53 
(Cichonski et al.). NIST recommends that government incident handling teams establish 
an array of facilities and on-hand information to include network diagrams, issue tracking 
systems, and other key capabilities during the preparation stage (Cichonski et al.). These 
additional tools are critically important for incident handlers during their response to future 
incidents.  
Following the conclusion of the preparation stage, NIST recommends that incident 
handling teams focus on mitigating the impact of future incidents during the detection and 
analysis stage. NIST suggests that incident handling teams leverage the security standards 
and protocols referenced in NIST Special Publication 800–53, Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) Publications, and the Committee on National Security 
Systems (CNSS) Instruction 1253, to enact robust preventative measures. However, 
incident handling teams must have the monitoring and notification tools and procedures 
necessary to identify and respond to the adverse events that inevitably do occur. NIST’s 
incident handling guide identifies that for many organizations the most difficult task 
involved with the incident handling process is accurately detecting and assessing potential 
incidents (Cichonski et al.). During the detection and analysis stage, incident handling 
teams leverage their suite of tools and organic experience to identify and respond to an 
incident’s early warning signs. When implemented effectively, monitoring and detection 
tools, notification escalation hierarchies, and incident prioritization and categorization 
methods can assist an incident handling team with quarantining, eradication and service 
restoration efforts.  
Once an incident has been confirmed and the appropriate analysis is complete, 
incident troubleshooting, containment, and eradication are often tied to and directed by an 
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organization’s incident categorization policy. Incident prioritization and categorization are 
the results of careful analysis of the risks and impact levels associated with a given system 
or set of systems (Cichonski et al.). Whether an organization is experiencing a basic 
Internet Protocol outage, malware infection, or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attack, the incident handling and containment procedures will be characterized by actions 
and timelines identified in the prioritization policy (Cichonski et al.). As outlined in NIST’s 
Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations, the 
prioritization and containment guidelines instituted by an organization typically result from 
an analysis of the likelihood of damage to the network, exploited resource classification 
levels, critical core service requirements, and restoration timelines (NIST, 2018). A clear 
understanding of incident prioritization and system impact categorization is vital for an 
effective incident handling team to be able to ensure operational continuity despite a system 
degradation. In most organizations the containment and eradication processes occur in a 
tiered response structure. Coimbatore Chandersekaran and William Simpson, authors of 
“A Multi-tiered Approach to Enterprise Support Services” (2011) identified these tiered 
levels of troubleshooting support as levels 0–3. Level 0 represented user self-help 
technologies, Level 1 represented basic help desk support to include over-the-phone and 
chatroom troubleshooting techniques, Level 2 represented proactive monitoring techniques 
and engineering services that required advanced troubleshooting capabilities, and Level 3 
represented active monitoring and security capabilities; Level 3 technician’s may conduct 
on site physical troubleshooting and could potentially include contracted vendor support 
(Chandersekaran & Simpson, 2011). This tiered incident response strategy presents a 
succinct method for incident handling teams to organize their containment and eradication 
capabilities. 
NIST identifies that incident recovery does not stop after normal system operation 
has been restored. During the post-incident activity stage of the incident handling life cycle, 
the remediation and documentation of vulnerabilities is an ongoing task that falls within 
the responsibilities of incident handling personnel to prevent similar incidents in the future 
(Cichonski et al.). Following an incident NIST recommends that organizations focus on 
learning and improving through the use of a “lessons learned” meeting with all parties that 
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were involved in the handling of the incident (Cichonski et al.). Post-incident activity 
should detail any characteristic of an incident or it’s handling that either inhibited timely 
recovery or successfully mitigated the impact of the event. NIST identifies that the 
collection and analysis of lessons learned information is only one step to effectively 
completing the post-incident activity stage, organizations must also use that collected data 
to implement new policies and procedures to continue to enhance their response to future 
incidents (Cichonski et al.). 
3. NIST’s Relationship to Other Frameworks 
These incident handling principles outlined by NIST are pertinent to the 
requirements imposed by public policy on the MCEN as they establish the baseline for 
recommendations for improvement to the incident handling process within a given DOD 
Enterprise Network. It is important to note that there are a significant number of other 
security and incident handling frameworks used by the private industry that have been 
developed by trade organizations, financial regulatory bodies, and for-profit audit and 
certification organizations. These other frameworks were created to meet needs within 
specific sectors of industry. While each of these frameworks have their own nuances and 
implementation paradigms, they draw from the same fundamental security and incident 
handling concepts upon which NIST has drawn in the development of their framework. As 
findings are presented throughout this research, the differences found in these other 
frameworks as they apply to participating organizations will be identified. Analyzing and 
understanding the frameworks and implementations observed in private industry may have 
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II. FINDINGS 
A. NIST AND ORGANIZATIONAL INCIDENT HANDLING POLICY 
In this section, results and findings from interviews and questionnaires are 
organized and presented according to how they pertain to the different stages of NIST’s 
incident handling life cycle. The one exception to this being the inclusion of an initial stage 
zero on policy, which was added due to the role which policy plays directly or indirectly 
in how an organization responds to an incident. NIST’s incident handling framework omits 
any direct discussion on policy because the NIST principles and framework were originally 
developed for the express purpose of implementation on U.S. federal information systems, 
making usage of U.S. federal policy a given. This chapter on policy primarily addresses 
some of the differences in stated policy from that which is observed, as well as explores 
other policies and frameworks not developed by NIST observed during research. Following 
the chapter on policy, findings are organized by first addressing the preparation and 
protection phase of the incident handling life cycle and then followed by detection and 
analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery, and finally post-incident activity. In this 
section when specific organizations are referenced, they identified only by their industry 
or business sector due to the number of participants that expressed a desire to remain 
anonymous. 
1. DOD Policy Adoption 
Despite requirements imposed on the DOD by the succession of congressional 
directives mentioned previously it is surprising to find how infrequently participating DOD 
organizations were aware of the frameworks developed by NIST or policies outlined in the 
Federal Information Security Act. In the course of this research, only 40% of participating 
federal government organizations mentioned any adherence to U.S. federal government 
policy, outside of directives and standard operating procedures that were developed at the 
local level. Within the other 60% of participating organizations, this research found that 
network operators and incident handlers followed local directives and procedures with little 
knowledge or understanding of parent directives developed at higher echelons of 
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command. While local procedures and directives can and should be developed in order to 
fill gaps and provide specificity unavailable in parent policies, those policies from which 
local procedures are derived should still be referenced and maintained in order to establish 
a foundation of consistency and clarity. In the cases where the federally mandated 
framework was not commonly used, participating organizations referenced frameworks 
and procedures outlined by the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) or 
other third parties than those mandated by Congressional policy (Agutter, 2019).  
In many cases, the frameworks developed by ITIL and other third parties that are 
being used by DOD organizations meet or exceed the minimum requirements defined by 
NIST. Additionally, implementing a hybrid framework which knits together concepts from 
multiple sources is certainly a viable solution as will be explored in the following section. 
However, the most concerning finding among participating DOD organizations that are 
using these non-NIST frameworks, is that the derived policies being used at the local 
organization level are so far removed from federally-mandated policies and practices, that 
network operators and incident handlers are now unaware of their origin. These findings 
point to two major systemic issues. The first is an overall lack of standardization and 
accountability among DOD organizations with regards to networks and IT systems. While 
NIST is charged with providing a standard for U.S. federal government organizations to 
follow, adherence to that standard is left to leadership within each branch and is not tightly 
controlled or enforced by a central entity. Without external accountability, these 
organizations have little incentive to conform to federally mandated policy. Second, 
services within the DOD have historically operated disparate networks with little need to 
integrate with one another, thus eliminating the requirement for a standardized approach 
when it comes to network incident handling. The vestiges of this siloed approach have 
inevitably led to a culture of self-conformity, resulting in inconsistency and hindered 
interoperability. 
2. Customer-Driven Hybrid Policies 
Ironically, participants within private industry and academia were far more eager 
to comply with the NIST incident handling framework (62.5%); though, compliance 
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occurred as a result of very different motivating factors than their counterparts within the 
federal government. The decision to adhere to a given policy and meet certain compliance 
metrics within the private industry and academia was almost entirely driven by their given 
customer-base. In the case of those participants that did business with the federal 
government, this meant adherence to NIST and FISMA regulation was required. In the case 
where participants did business with the banking industry, healthcare, or domestic aviation, 
this resulted in similar compliance with Payment Card Industry (PCI), Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
practices and standards. Additionally, several for-profit organizations have developed 
other frameworks and standards that are being used by the private industry in a best-
practices capacity which meet or exceed those standards required by NIST. While such an 
eclectic hybrid approach is neither required nor viable for federal government 
organizations, the fact that 87.5% of participants within private industry and academia have 
managed to use hybrid frameworks, many of which incorporate NIST standards (62.5%), 
shows the viability of this approach in real-world applications. The question then becomes 
whether this hybrid paradigm is what some DOD organizations were attempting all along, 
but somehow fell short in implementation along the way? In either case, the choice to adopt 
a hybrid approach should be made with a complete knowledge and understanding of what 
is outlined in U.S. federal law, providing a foundation upon which other policy decision 
can be made. There is little evidence that NIST was used as a foundation when other 
frameworks were adopted by DOD organizations, which makes earlier conclusions about 
the lack of NIST compliance much more likely. 
3. The Role of Service Level Agreements 
Despite differences in approaches to policy and incident handling framework 
implementation, one these that was found to be critical among all participants was the 
impact and role played by service level agreements (SLAs). All participants in both 
government and private organizations mentioned that some subset of capabilities was being 
outsourced to some degree, and that outsourcing involved an SLA in some capacity. 
Additionally, all participants noted the inherent tradeoffs between capability, cost, and 
speed when dealing with external service providers or contractors during the incident 
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handling process. When participants responded about interactions with these service 
providers, they all alluded to the fact that having contact with engineers or experts for a 
particular service or system was a worthwhile capability. The contributions provided to an 
organization’s ability to troubleshoot and integrate a particular system with the larger 
whole was the primary motivation for engaging as-a-service type contracts and, when 
funding was available, have some sort of expert on retainer. However, the main deterrent 
from simply outsourcing everything was speed and cost. Every time an incident handler 
was required to go outside of the organization to engage a contractor or help desk for an 
external resource or system, the incident handling process was noted to be appreciably 
slower. This can be a significant issue for time and mission critical systems, a risk that was 
mitigated by some participants through geographically collocated contracted support 
personnel, or access to near real-time communications with service providers. There are 
two major inhibitors noted by participants when it comes to contracted services and SLAs: 
First is that this support comes at a monetary cost that can easily be prohibitive. Second, 
having an unclear understanding of responsibilities between service providers and incident 
handling personnel can also lead to a swift unraveling of intended benefits, leaving incident 
response teams between Scylla and Charybdis.  
From a cost perspective, participants mentioned support for services ranging from 
a limited number of remote helpdesk hours available to having employees from supporting 
organizations on site in a fulltime status and everything in between. The general consensus 
(66.6%) among participants was that one often gets what one pays for in that regard. While 
the latter service model is robust and immediate, it was often prohibitively expensive for 
all but the largest organizations with the most to lose for a given outage. In one case in 
particular, a major cloud service provider has begun to limit the number of full-time 
contractors for certain systems; instead, opting to pay for system-specific training or simply 
hire system experts outright as a cost-saving measure. At the other end of the spectrum, 
50% of participants that had very basic levels of service also identified a noticeable increase 
in the overall timeline for a given outage that involved external support or services. The 
decision to opt for a more robust support package was often tied to system and service 
prioritization and an organization’s own responsibilities to their customers. This means for 
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many participating organizations multiple service level agreement models and support 
packages were in effect, and each was based on restoration and support requirements of 
individual systems. Depending on the size of the organization and the complexity of 
systems they operate, this network of SLAs can quickly become complicated and unwieldy. 
In general, participants within the private industry were more effective in managing 
SLAs and the responsibilities of service support personnel at the network operations and 
incident handling personnel level. This is primarily because these participants tend to be 
flatter in their organization, with fewer levels of obscuration between those who develop 
and implement SLAs, and those who interact with the systems those SLAs involve. There 
is certainly precedent for robust and well-managed SLAs within federal government 
organizations. However, there tended to be less control over the SLAs at an operational 
level and 40% of participants within the federal government expressed past issues where 
SLAs were not specific or adequate enough to eliminate ambiguity in responsibility. In 
order to maximize the effectiveness of contracted or service provider support, 83.3% 
participants identified the need for clearly defined and understood SLAs that appropriately 
delineate areas of responsibility and performance metrics for both the supporting and 
supported parties both internal to the organization and externally. Having robust policies 
and SLAs in place from the outset provides a stable platform upon which operational 
decisions and incident handling practices are built. Once the incident handling life cycle is 
in motion, little can be done to attempt to fix inadequate policy decisions post-hoc. 
B. NIST AND ORGANIZATIONAL INCIDENT HANDLING 
PREPARATION 
As part of the adoption and implementation of the appropriate policy, organizations 
must begin to execute preparatory actions to ensure they are ready to respond to adverse 
events impacting their users. As such, the implementation of sound incident preparation 
and prevention procedures is critical to the success of an incident handling team. NIST 
recognizes that even when recommended security controls are in place, incidents cannot 
be eliminated completely. This chapter will provide a comprehensive review of the 
preparatory steps necessary to build a proactive incident response capability as identified 
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in NIST’s incident handling guide, as well as the unique perspectives from several 
participants within the research sample. 
1. Incident Response Plans, Policies, and Procedures 
Although incident response plans, policies, and procedures are typically nuanced 
based on individual use-cases; NIST offers overarching incident response concepts that 
may be applicable across multiple industries. The NIST incident handling guide 
recommends that organizations define the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of their 
incident response team prior to implementation (Cichonski et al.). The goal is to identify 
the scope of services to be provided by the incident handling team and transparent 
operating lanes in which incident handlers can successfully perform their duties. Despite 
differences in the business objectives that drive incident handling policy among U.S. 
federal government organizations, NIST recommends that at a minimum the following 
elements be included in each organization’s policy:  
1. A statement of management commitment. 
2. The purpose and objectives of the policy. 
3. Definition of computer security incidents and related terms. 
4. Organizational structure and definition of roles, responsibilities, and levels 
of authority. 
5. Prioritization or severity ratings of incidents. 
6. Performance measures. 
7. Reporting and contact forms (Cichonski et al., p. 8).  
Especially important in NIST’s recommendations is the implementation of incident 
severity scores or ratings. It is common for incident handling teams to become 
overwhelmed with the sheer volume of notifications, missing critical threats and outages 
in the process. Incident handlers must be prepared with transparent incident severity 
scorecards to establish an incident rating immediately to categorize the incident and initiate 
the troubleshooting process.  
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Several of the participants from the research sample (77%) implemented incident 
handling policies and procedures that are nearly identical to that recommended by NIST’s 
incident handling guide. Every organization in the sample created well-defined policies 
and procedures that guide incident handling requirements for their incident handling teams. 
All research participants within private industry leverage NIST’s recommended concepts 
in some fashion; however, only 40% of the U.S. federal government organizations 
interviewed were familiar with the concepts recommended in NIST’s incident handling 
guide. This result was surprising; several of the individual spokespersons from U.S. federal 
government organizations even admitted to being unaware of NIST’s incident handling 
guide. As discussed earlier, the major differentiator between public and private 
organizations’ incident handling policies was that private organization policy was largely 
guided by contractual agreements or SLAs while U.S. federal government organizational 
policy is guided by hierarchical regulations.  
Critical to organizational incident handling policy is incident rating and 
categorization procedures. Every participant had established an incident rating and 
categorization policy; however, the details requisite to each policy varied significantly. 
Each participant within private industry reported that SLAs played a critical role in 
determining incident prioritization and categorization for services provided to their 
customers. One participant, a cloud service provider, offered that categorization and 
scoring are typically focused on the value of the asset (system or service) being threatened 
or degraded. That same participant offered that the actor performing the exploitation also 
factors into an incident’s priority level. On the other hand, U.S. federal government 
participants tended to rely on metrics-based rating and categorization policies. These 
organizations focused on variables including number of users impacted, geographic area 
impacted, and the type of service being impacted. All U.S. federal government 
organizations had developed policies that identified an enterprise service as non-mission 
critical or critical core. Multiple U.S. federal government organizations suggested that 
incident troubleshooting is typically carried out by contracted vendor support, and incident 
rating and categorization policy agreed upon within SLAs inevitably determines how a 
vendor will respond to an incident. One such participant suggested that contractual 
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agreements written two to three years in the past may not account for new technologies 
that their users have become reliant on, hence incident rating and categorization should 
always remain negotiable. 
The introduction of new technologies has resulted in a strategic transition to cloud-
based incident handling models. All participants reported that at least one of their incident 
handling services was now primarily available via a cloud-based solution or, at a minimum, 
contracted to an agency that was operating the service in the cloud. As a result of this 
transition, incident handling teams have become increasingly dependent on off-premise 
personnel and network infrastructure to carry out their incident handling procedures. 
Participants from both U.S. federal government organizations and the private industry 
alluded to the fact that cloud-based incident handling architectures allowed for 
interoperability, scalability, ease-of-use, information sharing, and enhanced collaboration. 
However, the transition has not occurred without drawbacks. Amongst other negative 
outcomes, U.S. federal government participants admitted to the fact that reliance on off-
premise technicians has at times resulted in troubleshooting delays. One government 
organization explained that relying on vendors to solely troubleshoot service outages has 
resulted in delays as significant as six months. 
2. Incident Handling Team Structures 
One facet of an incident handling model prioritized by NIST is the creation of an 
incident handling team, or the personnel responsible for carrying out incident handling 
procedures. NIST identified that in most instances, incident handling teams require a 
manager, technical lead, and incident handlers (Cichonski et al., 2012). NIST recommends 
that team members have a wide range of technical and interpersonal skills including 
network administration, programming, technical support, and intrusion detection, as well 
as teamwork and communications skills (Cichonski et al.). 
NIST’s incident handling guide offers that incident handling teams are not intended 
to be self-sufficient; teams require support from several other groups within their respective 
organization. Executive management support is amongst the most important. Executive 
management is typically responsible for staffing, budgeting, and establishing policy, which 
21 
are all critical elements when implementing an incident handling capability (Cichonski et 
al.). This characteristic of incident handling makes executive management support critical 
to the success of an incident handling team (Cichonski et al.). Incident handling teams also 
require assistance from Information Assurance (IA) and Information Technology (IT) 
specialists (Cichonski et al.). Security incidents nearly always require IA specialists who 
can perform containment, eradication, and recovery techniques. While other network-
related incidents require advanced troubleshooting and network configuration, these 
troubleshooting steps are typically performed by IT specialists. Incident handling teams 
should also consider adding subject matter experts with legal, public affairs, human 
resources, physical security, and business continuity experience (Cichonski et al.). 
NIST’s incident handling guide also suggests various incident handling team 
models based on the size and mission of the organization. NIST recommends that small 
organizations leverage a centralized incident response team structure. In this type of 
structure, one incident handling team is geographically collocated and is responsible for 
resolving incidents throughout an organization (Cichonski et al.). For larger organizations, 
NIST recommends using a distributed incident response team, wherein multiple support 
teams are distributed geographically within an organization to support regionalized users 
(Cichonski et al.). Finally, NIST has found that some organizations may benefit from the 
development of coordinating teams or a team of teams, wherein a centralized incident 
response team provides advice to smaller disaggregate teams within an organization 
without having direct authority over those teams (Cichonski et al., 2012). 
Participant incident handling team sizes varied significantly as a result of the 
research sample’s diverse participant pool. Teams ranged in size from more than one-
hundred members for one participant, to three members for another. One common theme 
that nearly every participant indicated was that incident handling teams are becoming 
increasingly disaggregate; 77% of participants indicated that their teams were located in 
several regions across the globe or even working from home. One of the larger participants, 
a software-as-a-service company, noted that implementing a disaggregate model allows 
organizations the opportunity to hire incident handlers and technicians who are located 
around the world. The organization suggested that the days of relying on an applicant pool 
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within the general vicinity of your company’s headquarters are gone. Organizations can 
now look for unique talent and skills across the globe to create an increasingly effective 
remote workforce.  
Incident handling teams within the sample also had an eclectic range of 
professionals serving within each respective team. As NIST recommended, incident 
handling teams from nearly every organization included at least one IA, IT, and security 
professional; however, there were a few unique capabilities that organizations decided to 
include within their incident handling teams. A few of the unique professions that were 
added to private industry incident handling teams were emergency management 
professionals, application-specific subject matter experts, and in one case, an 
anthropologist. One participant, a large CSP, explained that anthropologists provide 
incident handling teams with a different perspective on human behavior and how an 
attacker may be analyzing an enterprise network for vulnerabilities. One private, multi-
billion-dollar organization stated that they look for former electricians and plumbers to 
serve as incident handlers because these applicants typically excel at troubleshooting 
physical device issues. While the private industry is hiring the IA and IT professionals 
recommended by NIST, they’re also looking for unique capabilities and are thinking 
outside the box when assembling their incident handling teams. 
One reoccurring theme from the research sample was that U.S. federal government 
participants were becoming increasingly reliant on contracted vendor support to assist with 
incident handling responsibilities. The alarming thing about this transition is that all U.S. 
federal government organizations also stated that incident time-to-restoration can be 
increased during incidents that require off-premises vendor support. Naturally, government 
organizations that paid vendors to physically locate incident handlers on-site, within their 
enterprise operations centers, indicated that these liaisons were extremely helpful. One 
government organization paid to have eight contracted, vendor technicians on site to 
support incident handling and enterprise planning operations. 
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3. Incident Handler Training 
NIST’s incident handling guide does not specifically state the type of training that 
incident handling teams should receive initially or annually. NIST instead includes broad 
training information in Special Publication 800–84, Guide to Test, Training, and Exercise 
Programs for IT Plans and Capabilities. In SP 800–84, NIST identifies that all training 
plans have four unique phases: Design, Development, Conduct, and Evaluation (Grance et 
al., 2006). NIST defines training as a continuum of learning activities that enables staff to 
maintain their skills and technical proficiencies (Grance et al., 2006). NIST breaks practical 
application training into three categories: exercises, tests, and actual emergency situations; 
and individual training into two categories: instructor-led and self-study (Grance et al., 
2006). By implementing a detailed and well-scheduled training plan that includes both 
practical application events and individual training, NIST suggests that a training plan 
should be capable of assisting employees with maintaining and advancing their 
capabilities. 
Although not directly mentioned in NIST SP 800-61 or NIST SP 800-84, the U.S. 
federal government has established compliance requirements for defense enterprise 
network professionals, to include incident handlers. The compliance manual that contains 
this information is DOD 8570.01-M, Information Assurance Workforce Improvement 
Program. The DOD 8570 provides guidance and procedures for the training, certification, 
and management of the DOD workforce conduct of IA functions (Grimes, 2005). The 
manual details the responsibilities carried out by IA professionals and the formal 
certifications necessary for personnel (civilian, military, and contractor) to receive 
permissions on defense enterprise networks.  
The rigidity of the compliance manual does not align well with NIST SP 800-84 
training recommendations. NIST recommends the implementation of a fluid training 
schedule that includes both practical application as well as individual study, while the 
compliance manual focuses on formal certification requirements. The compliance manual 
is likely best suited as an initial training initiative to be built upon through the 
implementation of practical tests and exercises. However, many of the government 
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participants in the research sample indicated that this is not how requirements outlined in 
the DOD 8570 were being treated. 
The DOD 8570 details an extremely specific training pipeline for U.S. federal 
government employees to pursue. All U.S. federal government participants (100%) 
identified the DOD 8570 as their source training document. This was not the case for 
private industry participants. Private industry unanimously stressed the importance of 
experience over formal certifications and discussed how experience may be a more suitable 
litmus test for potential incident handling applicants’ abilities. The private industry has the 
luxury of being able to hire anyone. Having the latitude to define hiring requirements 
means specific certifications are quickly being dismissed in favor of individual experience.  
Although DOD 8570 compliance is required by law within U.S. federal government 
organizations, there are a wide range of individual certifications that could potentially meet 
compliance standards, and once a particular certification is achieved, there is very little in 
the way of continuing education, system specific certification, or defined training pipelines 
for advancement. As NIST SP 800-84 describes, incident handling team leadership should 
be evaluating opportunities to include exercise and response tests within annual training 
schedules. Several of the research participants (54%) admitted to focusing on individual 
training, whether it be instructor-led or self-study, rather than practical application. A 
common theme was that practical application training was often very difficult to implement 
on a real-world or operational enterprise network. This meant that practical application 
training often did not exist and was simply substituted with on-the-job training. In this 
training environment, incident response personnel learned using over-the-shoulder or 
learning through mistake training techniques.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL INCIDENT DETECTION, VALIDATION, 
ANALYSIS, AND NOTIFICATION 
Once an incident handling team has been established and the organization’s 
incident handlers have been trained appropriately, incident handling teams must execute 
the plans, policies, and procedures that have been put in place to respond to an incident. 
This can be a daunting process as incident handlers are often required to analyze thousands 
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of alerts, anomalies, and individual incidents daily. An organization’s proficiency in the 
art of detection, validation, and early analysis can limit the severity of a service 
degradation’s impact on operations, or possibly prevent the outage entirely. 
1. Incident Detection and Validation 
NIST classifies early warning signs as events that are about to occur and categorizes 
them into two categories: precursors and indicators (Cichonski et al., 2012). A precursor is 
a sign that an incident is likely to occur in the future, such as a press release identifying a 
new known network vulnerability (Cichonski et al.). Conversely, an indicator is a sign that 
an incident has already taken place (Cichonski et al.). Indicators can include computer 
security software alerts, anomalous log-file activity, unusual network traffic flows, or even 
user support requests (Cichonski et al.). To successfully identify precursors and indicators, 
NIST recommends the use of automated detection capabilities such as network-based and 
host-based intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS), log analyzers, and computer 
security software to assist incident handling teams with incident detection (Cichonski et 
al.). While these applications and computer security tools have become increasingly 
automated over the past decade, incident handlers are still expected to have requisite 
technical knowledge and experience to appropriately sort through the sensor and 
application data necessary to diagnose ongoing incidents (Cichonski et al.).  
Once an early warning sign has been detected, incident handling teams must act 
immediately. Following early warning sign detection, the first step an incident handling 
team must accomplish is incident validation (Cichonski et al.). Incident validation has 
become increasingly difficult for incident handlers as a result of overwhelming amounts of 
data that must be analyzed to confirm incidents. Incident handlers typically use multiple 
applications to detect incidents, as a result, application notification volume has become 
unreasonably high. NIST identified that the notification volume for many organizations 
now surpasses thousands or even millions of sensor alerts each day (Cichonski et al.). 
The research sample established several unique methods and various sets of tools 
and applications for incident detection, validation, analysis, and notification. Every 
research participant had established incident detection tools to identify early warning signs; 
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however, the tools mentioned by participants were nearly always different. Many of the 
sample’s private industry participants had developed proprietary tool sets that were 
engineered specifically for their respective networks. One of the most significant findings 
was that 100% of private industry participants had developed or implemented application 
programming interface (API) technologies that proactively monitored their organization’s 
critical applications. These tools assisted private organizations and automated the 
monitoring of applications most critical to users and customers.  
Application monitoring represented a capability that the research sample’s federal 
government participants were not implementing. None of the federal government 
participants had identified a method or technology capable of automating application 
monitoring services for their entire suite of critical applications. One federal government 
participant identified that passive application monitoring was at the top of their priority list 
and that they were currently in the process of requesting Request for Proposals (RFPs) 
from multiple vendors to provide this capability. Another federal government participant 
pointed out that their incident handling team was highly reliant on customer support 
requests to identify early warning signs of an impending incident. The participant alluded 
to nearly 80% of their incidents being identified by customers after the incident had already 
taken place. This was a common theme for federal government participants within the 
research sample: federal government participant incident response was largely reactive 
while private industry maintained a pro-active posture, identifying incidents prior to 
occurrence. 
2. Incident Analysis 
Following incident validation, teams conduct preliminary incident analysis to 
initiate the organization’s incident notification and communication process. In these 
instances, it is incumbent upon the incident response team to notify the appropriate 
technical support agents, organizational leadership, and in some instances external 
agencies to include law enforcement and the media. This is precisely why the team’s early 
analysis is so critical; incident handling teams that misdiagnose an incident may notify 
technical support agents incapable of troubleshooting the outage, which inevitably extends 
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time-to-restoration. NIST recommends that early analysis should attempt to determine the 
incident’s scope, the networks and systems impacted, who or what originated the incident, 
and how the incident is occurring or the reason for outage (Cichonski et al., 2012). NIST 
also emphasizes the importance of communication between incident handlers and the 
business units they support. 
After an incident had been validated, 100% of research participants established a 
hierarchical incident analysis and reporting posture similar to that explained in Coimbatore 
Chandersekaran and William Simpson’s work on tiered incident troubleshooting 
methodology. Although participants referred to their analysis and reporting chains using 
various terminology, many of the participants established a tiered troubleshooting concept 
to respond to ongoing incidents. Nearly half (46%) of the sample’s participants had 
implemented tiered incident response and analysis measures in some capacity. Several 
(60%) private industry participants had experienced a level of success automating their 
TIER 0 support mechanisms or user self-service support structures. This included online 
do-it-yourself troubleshooting portals and password recovery mechanisms in some 
instances. In all cases, after an incident had been identified and validated, the incident 
documentation process would commence and notification of the appropriate personnel, 
whether it be technicians, leadership, or outside agencies, would be initiated. 
3. Incident Notification 
NIST recommends prioritizing the incident documentation and notification process 
during each event using an issue tracking system. Proprietary incident tracking systems 
mentioned during the research questionnaire included: Remedy, PagerDuty, and 
ServiceNow. These systems allow incident handlers to track the progress of an incident; 
they typically result in fewer systematic errors by increasing situational awareness 
(Cichonski et al.). NIST offers that such systems also increase time-to-restoration because 
they allow for synchronized efforts and increased collaboration (Cichonski et al.). The 
items that NIST recommends including during incident logging included significant items 
such as the incident’s current status, early warning signs or indicators, Chain of custody, 
and the next steps to be taken to resolve the ongoing issue (Cichonski et al., 2012). 
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As the incident is being documented, incident handlers must notify the appropriate 
personnel to ensure that the incident is managed effectively. As discussed in previous 
chapters, there is a litany of individuals and organizations that must remain abreast of the 
ongoing incident depending on the threat and the systems impacted by the incident. NIST 
recommends that at a minimum, incident handlers must have defined procedures for 
reporting incidents (Cichonski et al.). These procedures should include a list of personnel, 
positions, and organizations to be contacted based on the incident in progress. NIST 
identified that common notification lists include chief information officers, information 
security professionals, internal and external incident response agencies, human resources, 
system owners, public affairs, legal, and law enforcement when necessary (Cichonski et 
al.). NIST recognizes that there are multiple technical platforms and applications available 
to streamline the notification process; however, NIST recommends the use of email, 
websites (portals), telephone, and in-person briefings (Cichonski et al.). 
Incident notification is one area in which private industry and federal government 
research participants appear to have the largest procedural disparity. Multiple private 
industry participants (80%) indicated that their organizations are using automated 
processes and applications to notify technicians, IA professionals, organizational 
leadership, customers, and the authorities of ongoing incidents. This percentage of 
notification automation becomes more relevant as it was also identified that none of the 
federal government participants admitted to using automation in their respective incident 
notification processes. Multiple private industry participants (80%) were logging historical 
incident information and configuring their notification systems in a manner such that 
following an incident, the system would automatically generate a trouble ticket and based 
on the characteristics of the incident, the notification system would proceed to notify the 
appropriate technical agents, system owners, organizational leadership and external 
organizations. These automated logging and notification configurations almost certainly 
result in significant decreases in an organization’s mean restoration timelines. 
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D. ORGANIZATIONAL INCIDENT CONTAINMENT, ERADICATION, 
AND RECOVERY 
A good network incident containment strategy primarily provides two things: a 
limit on the spread to other network resources once an incident is validated, and additional 
time to implement the required eradication and resolution strategies (NIST, 2012). In either 
case, NIST emphasizes that an “essential part of containment is decision-making” and as 
such, decisions that affect adjacent business units cannot be made unilaterally within the 
IT department (NIST, pp. 35). In many cases, these decisions can be streamlined “if there 
are predetermined strategies and procedures for containing the incident” (NIST, 2012, 
p.35). However, the effects of an incident are rarely limited to just a single business unit, 
and in these cases, effective communication is key to efficient recovery. 
1. Containment Strategy 
Several research participants from academia and private industry discussed how 
leveraging communication platforms and workflow applications enhances communication 
between incident handlers and business unit leadership. Conversely, several participants 
from the federal government identified that these communications techniques were absent 
and noted that their primary source of initial incident information typically came from their 
local helpdesk. Within private industry and academia, all but two participating 
organizations tackled the business leadership integration problem through periodic strategy 
alignment meetings that took place with a daily, weekly, or monthly frequency. There were 
two primary instances where communication was continuous between incident 
management teams and business leadership. In both instances, the participant was a large 
private organization in the technology and cloud computing field. These two outlying 
private organizations took a different approach whereby leadership and subject matter 
experts from supported business units directly participated in the incident handling process 
through inclusion within the communication chain. In one case, a technology service 
provider chose to position business unit leadership and subject matter experts at key 
positions on the incident handling watch floor. While this level of involvement is not 
practical or even possible for all organizations and industries, the ease of communication 
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and unity of effort across business sectors expressed by those organizations that 
continuously included business leadership in the incident handling process was profound.  
Contrary to what was observed in private industry and academia, participants 
within the federal government reported having trouble communicating with supported 
organization leadership. This was primarily due to the size and diversity of supported 
organizations and the hierarchical gap that separates incident handlers from those they 
support. In one case, incident management team leadership prioritized daily meetings with 
network management personnel acting as a mediator between IT personnel and 
organizational operations, though this was still limited by a rigid command structure. In 
another case, a government organization mentioned future efforts to develop and 
implement an exchange program between network managers from satellite network sectors 
to facilitate cross-training.  
While both participants mentioned above are taking steps that resemble practices 
observed in the private industry, all government organizations identified a marked 
disconnect in communication between supported organizational leadership and supporting 
incident handling personnel. At best, incident management personnel relied on experiential 
knowledge of supported operations to understand service outage impact. At worst, service 
impact was only recognized after service interruption was in effect and the supported 
organization had engaged the helpdesk. The size and information sharing rigidity of federal 
government organizations certainly present unique challenges to communication and 
decision-making required in incident containment; however, the discrepancy between 
government and non-government participants was quite stark. 
2. Evidence Gathering and Handling 
In the process of troubleshooting and resolving an outage, incident handlers 
encounter and collect information that can be classified as evidence for future litigation 
should the cause of the outage be attributed to malicious intent. While incident 
management teams should remain cognizant that their actions and the data collected during 
the course of outage resolution may be used as evidence in a criminal investigation, NIST 
advises that they “generally stay focused on containment, eradication, and recovery” as 
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spending time conducting in-depth forensics “can be a time-consuming and futile process 
that can prevent a team from achieving its primary goal—minimizing the business impact” 
(2012, p.36-37). That being said, the desire to avoid task-creep among the incident handling 
team in no way abdicates them from detailed documentation practices. Instead, NIST 
makes the case that standard incident handling documentation practices should integrate 
evidence handling and forensic techniques as a matter of course, and is further outlined in 
NIST Special Publication 800–86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident 
Response (2006).  
Discussions on evidence gathering in the incident handling life cycle with 
participating organizations can be broken down into two major components: logging and 
interaction with law enforcement. The impact of network and system logs is typically 
determined long before an incident ever takes place and is closely tied to other phases in 
the incident handling life cycle as well as to higher-level policy decisions. Much of the 
specific recommendations for system logging are outlined in NIST’s 800–53 and 800–92 
Special Publications; however, the eradication and recovery phase of the incident handling 
life cycle is where sound logging policy decisions begin to bear fruit (NIST, 2020, 2006).  
All participants identified having established system logging policy either at the 
local or enterprise level, although the policies for system log retention varied significantly 
from years to only a few months depending on the industry and customer requirements. 
Federal government organizations required the most robust long-term system logging 
policies, up to five years in some cases, due to U.S. federal government information control 
policies that are heavily influenced by the classification level of the system or network. 
The most prominent difference between private industry and government participants was 
the level at which system logs were maintained. In all private industry participants, system 
logs were collected and maintained at the same business unit level in which those systems 
were operated and maintained. This means that incident handlers assigned to a particular 
network segment have direct access to the logs for systems within that same segment. 
Conversely, only one federal government agency participant maintained and analyzed 
system logs at this local level. Instead, system logs were typically maintained at the 
enterprise level and required local system troubleshooters and incident handlers to request 
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logs for a system when required. Finally, in cases where a participating organization used 
autonomous or semi-autonomous monitoring tools, network trend analysis was conducted 
periodically or in real-time. However, once this system data was archived according to 
organizational policy, all participants mentioned that these archived logs were only 
accessed on an ad-hoc basis should they be required for evidence or some other legal action. 
While there was some disparity between different industries in how logs are 
collected and maintained, there was a near consensus between all participants with regards 
to interaction with law enforcement. All participants interviewed identified that 
interactions with law enforcement and associated forensics analysis teams were as-needed 
once it became clear that criminal action was involved. All participants identified that 
incident handlers or in-house legal teams were authorized to pass criminal investigation 
and forensics procedures to local, state, or federal law enforcement as applicable. Only one 
private industry participant mentioned that it actively cultivated working relationships with 
law enforcement organizations in the form of invitations to audit network outage drills and 
war games. This same organization also mentioned membership to law enforcement-
backed trade organizations to facilitate information sharing on malicious actors, zero-day 
vulnerabilities, and exploits observed across industry. 
3. Eradication and Recovery 
When it comes to network incident recovery, steps taken in previous stages of the 
incident handling process begin to pay dividends. In this stage, NIST identifies recovery 
actions such as “restoring systems from clean backups, rebuilding systems from scratch, 
replacing compromised files with clean versions, installing patches, changing passwords, 
and tightening network perimeter security” that can only be effectively accomplished 
because of prior decisions and actions (NIST, pp.37). Similarly, many of the actions and 
processes initiated in earlier stages of the incident handling life cycle are continued in this 
later stage. Practices like “higher levels of system logging or network monitoring” are 
initiated in earlier stages and continued into the recovery stage (NIST, pp.37). For this 
reason, much more emphasis should be given to the feedback loops depicted in the incident 
handling life cycle (Figure 1), rather than the linear layout of the individual stages. 
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Therefore, much of this section will highlight system prioritization and continuity of 
operations plans that are typically designed and implemented in the policy and preparation 
stages since eradication and recovery ideally involves the timely and accurate execution of 
those plans and the associated reporting required to improve those plans for future use 
(NIST). 
All but one participant across private and government sectors indicated that they 
implement a continuity of operations plan and that the plan required testing at least on an 
annual basis. Exactly what was involved in each of these tests ranged broadly from annual 
continuity of operations meetings among business sectors to full scenario-based exercises 
and third-party penetration testing. However, only 16.6% of participating organizations 
mentioned doing any sort of large-scale incident handling drills or wargames with network 
incident handling personnel outside of periodic audits and penetration testing. Of the 
participants that were not conducting outage drills, many cited the fact that they were not 
willing to potentially interrupt live networks for the sake of training, and they did not find 
network simulation tools to be worth the expense. 
 All participants mentioned of the use of data backup and hardware 
redundancy solutions that were either implemented through redundant datacenters, cloud 
services, or on-site physical backups that can be leveraged to affect a recovery in the case 
of an outage. Of these three types of redundant systems, 23% of participants indicated they 
relied heavily on cloud technology and several others indicated a future transition to cloud 
solutions. Several participants (62%) also identified off-site backups or redundant 
datacenters, and finally only two participants mentioned they were heavily reliant on local 
backups in the case of a large-scale system restoration.  
More telling was how the level of automation within an organization’s restoration 
and service failover procedures correlated with the adoption of highly distributed cloud 
services that were either outsourced or operated directly by the participating organization. 
Of the 23% of participants that relied heavily on cloud-based backup and service failover 
solutions, all of them reported seamless or near-seamless (fifteen minutes or less) failover 
capabilities. Conversely, the remaining 77% of participants that used more traditionally 
managed redundant datacenters or local backups identified that failover required some sort 
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of intervention by network operations personnel though semi-autonomous, or fully manual 
means. As a result, restoration and failover in these semi-autonomous or manual systems 
was typically measured in hours rather than minutes. Additionally, the restoration timelines 
identified by those organizations that relied on contracted cloud services or off-site 
datacenter support were highly reliant on the service-level agreements associated with 
those systems and services. This fact further emphasizes the impact and role service-level 
agreements play in ensuring that restoration timelines meet customer and operational 
requirements, regardless of the technology implemented. 
4. Post-Incident Activity 
One of the most important stages of the incident handling life cycle, post-incident 
activities and reporting, is also the most frequently neglected. NIST emphasizes that upon 
completion of the restoration phase, “each incident response team should evolve to reflect 
new threats, improved technology, and lessons learned” (NIST, pp.38). The post-incident 
activity process includes post-incident meetings with business leadership and incident 
handling personnel, generation of reports from these meetings as well as the creation of a 
follow-up report outlining the details of the incident and the steps taken for recovery 
(NIST). NIST then recommends using the reports generated in the post-incident stage as 
training materials for new incident response personnel and as “a reference that can be used 
to assist in handling similar incidents” (pp. 39).  
Many of the research participants alluded to incident handling documentation and 
lessons learned procedures as having increased institutional knowledge and assisted with 
the prevention of similar incidents in the future. However, the questionnaire developed for 
this research did not directly address post-incident activity and knowledge management 
procedures. This stage of the incident handling life cycle warrants further research. It is 
likely that the U.S. private industry has established effective post-incident activity 
measures that have applicability for implementation within defense enterprise networks. 
The researchers identified that multiple organizations from U.S. private industry have 
begun to implement varying levels of automation during the post-incident activity stage.  
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One example was identified in a recently released Amazon whitepaper (Amazon, 
2021) on incident response. The whitepaper suggested incident handling teams could 
alleviate manual processes by automating steps in the post-incident activity stage (Amazon, 
2021). Amazon offered that technicians can define the incident remediation pattern, 
decompose the pattern into actionable logic, and create code capable of performing that 
logic during future incidents (Amazon). This technology would result in decreased time to 
restoration and potentially eliminate incident handler alert fatigue (Amazon). Although this 
type of technology was not directly discussed during the research questionnaire, it 
reinforces the concept that the U.S. private industry is presenting incident handling use-
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III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The goal of this research was to identify applicable U.S. private industry incident 
management policies, tools, and procedures that could potentially enhance the resilience 
and availability of defense enterprise networks. The questionnaire developed and used for 
this research rendered several key findings among private industry and federal government 
participants. The most significant findings are categorized into five major themes that are 
summarized and explored further in the following sections: Policy implementation, SLAs, 
personnel training and certification, automation, and communication with organizational 
leadership. These major themes are coupled with associated recommendations that may be 
used by leadership and incident handling personnel alike to further improve the incident 
handling posture of defense enterprise networks. While the conclusions and 
recommendations below are focused on defense networks, they are in no way exhaustive 
and many apply to a wide range of industries and organization types. The researcher’s 
recommendations are not intended to undermine the credibility of defense incident 
handling teams or to suggest that these changes alone would result in a fully functional 
incident handling capability. Instead, the recommendations below serve as a starting point 
for future growth within the defense network paradigm, as a key observation throughout 
this research was the relative success experienced by organizations that constantly sought 
intentional and introspective improvement through learning, research, and a willingness to 
adapt and change to new technologies and environments. 
A. POLICY ADOPTION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND DISSEMINATION 
Based on the research analysis, NIST’s Incident Handling Guide is clearly being 
leveraged across multiple industries by organizations ranging in size and responsibility. 
This prolific use appears to be because NIST provides incident handling teams with 
baseline procedural recommendations for each stage of the incident handling life cycle and 
allows organizations to deviate based on individual use case. NIST’s Incident Handling 
Guide is not an all-encompassing, rigid plan that impedes personalization. All research 
participants that used NIST frameworks admitted to deviating from NIST’s Incident 
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Handling Guide in some capacity; however, deviations were nearly always additive 
response measures that built upon NIST policy and not a complete departure from the 
guide’s recommendations.  
There were organizational disparities that became evident when analyzing private 
industry incident response methodology when compared to their counterparts in the U.S. 
federal government. Within government organizations, a large portion of incident handlers 
interviewed lacked conceptual understanding of how their respective organization’s 
incident handling policies related to federal policy and NIST’s incident handling 
framework. Incident handlers from less than half (40%) of the participating government 
organizations acknowledged that they understood the procedural requirements necessary 
to execute their daily job responsibilities but did not know if their organization’s incident 
handling procedures were derived from federal or local policies and directives. This was 
in contrast to what was seen in private industry and academia where organizational policy 
and frameworks were well known among incident handlers.  
Regardless of the framework or compliment of frameworks chosen for 
implementation on defense enterprise networks, if personnel tasked with handling outages 
are unfamiliar with the framework and its intent, any policy decisions made at higher 
echelons are irrelevant. Whether NIST, ITIL, or another incident handling framework, the 
researchers recommend that it should be clear at all levels what framework is being used 
and why. Public law and policy are not only complicated, but within a highly hierarchical 
organization such as the DOD, those policies and law become progressively more 
convoluted as they trickle through multiple levels of bureaucracy and layers of local policy 
are added during dissemination. This makes comprehensive understanding of applicable 
policy and associated legal documents produced across the entirety of the organization 
difficult to obtain. Also, incident handling personnel typically lack the time necessary to 
develop an understanding of public policy at this level. However, it is not unreasonable for 
incident handling personnel to have a working knowledge of foundational frameworks 
from which their standard operating procedures are derived. In fact, the DOD has a model 
for this type of documentation chain and standardization.  
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The Navy and Marine Corps aviation communities have a slew of governing 
publications that dictate everything from the legal requirements of operating an aircraft in 
civilian airspace to employment tactics in non-permissive combat environments. Each of 
these documents is rooted in complex layers of policy and doctrine; however, the 
publications referenced by the aircrew are written specifically to be read from the 
perspective of the operator. Each of these documents directly references governing policy 
documents from which they derive their authority and the Commander of Naval Air Forces 
(CNAF) has implemented the Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures 
Standardization (NATOPS) program as a check to ensure continuity and compliance 
among operators (i.e., aircrew), local standard operating procedures, and policies at the 
service branch level.  
Similarly, the researchers recommend service-level publications and 
standardization programs should be implemented for incident handling personnel to distill 
the substantial body of policy and procedure into operationally practical and 
organizationally auditable manuals that are derived directly from, and reference, 
established DOD policy. Additionally, the DOD should consider implementing joint or 
service branch level audit and standardization programs that control and disseminate 
changes to incident handling manuals, as well as audit local organizational policy and SOPs 
for compliance and implementation. This standardization agency should carry out 
inspections annually and be cognizant of systems and use cases that may be unique to 
certain organizations based on mission requirements. Equally as important, any centralized 
standardization body should provide a simple means for incident handlers to suggest 
changes to manuals and procedures based on what operators are seeing at the local level. 
Bottom-up learning and growth should be encouraged just as much as top-down 
standardization if the DOD is to remain agile and relevant. Having a centralized 
standardization body allows for bottom-up feedback to be quickly incorporated into official 
procedure and widely disseminated. This type of system can only be effective if it exists to 
serve the incident handling personnel at the local level and provide practical and easily 
digestible products. Additional levels of oversight with no other purpose will only add 
ambiguity and bureaucracy. The main purpose should be to establish the foundation of 
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what will eventually lead to a formalized community of practice that enhances and 
preserves the institutional knowledge of incident handlers across the DOD. 
In summary, organizational leadership should consider: 
• Committing to an incident handling policy and framework that applies to their 
needs and use-case and ensuring it is clearly communicated at all levels. 
• Establishing a standardization body to develop and disseminate practical and 
digestible tactics, techniques, and procedures publications to be used as a 
foundation for all incident handlers. 
• Establishing an annual inspection program to ensure compliance and 
standardization among subordinate organizations that can be adapted for any 
system and mission that may be unique to individual subordinate organizations. 
B. SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS 
All participants identified the importance of SLAs in policy implementation due to 
the role and impact they have on network incident response. Therefore, they cannot be 
ignored during the planning, implementation, or execution of the incident handling process. 
The creation of effective SLAs presents a difficult challenge for incident management 
personnel and organizational leadership because the terms of SLAs are typically decided 
years prior to implementation during the request for proposal (RFP) process. In the past, 
these decisions have excluded input from the incident management professionals 
responsible for carrying out the gamut of incident management responsibilities. Every 
research participant emphasized the critical role SLAs play in daily incident management 
operations; hence, incident handlers must develop an understanding of the details included 
in their respective organization’s contractual agreements. In general, the DOD’s hierarchal 
structure makes it easy for SLAs to become disjointed and misunderstood by incident 
handling teams attempting to troubleshoot contractually supported systems and services 
when compared to less complex organizations. The lines that subdivide areas of 
responsibility between incident handling teams and contractors can easily become unclear, 
leading to bottlenecks and longer resolution times. This issue will become increasingly 
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relevant as more services are outsourced or contracted in the DOD’s push for growth in 
cloud technologies and as-a-service paradigms.  
Fortunately, the issues surrounding SLA integration and mutual understanding of 
their terms by incident handlers and contracted support are closely related to the realm of 
policy implementation, and therefore can be similarly resolved. Just as public law, 
regulation, and high-level policy should be distilled down for practical understanding by 
incident handlers at the local level, SLAs should also be incorporated into local orders and 
daily incident handling tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Additionally, systems 
should be put in place to ensure that when contracts involving SLAs relevant to incident 
handlers are introduced or updated, the local policy and procedure manuals can be 
efficiently updated and controlled for accuracy. This duty should also fall onto the 
standards organization mentioned earlier, which should already be tasked with creating, 
and updating incident handling TTPs and manuals. Standards organizations can also act as 
intermediaries between contracted support and incident handling personnel. Finally, given 
the recommendation in the previous section that a standards organization should be 
responsible for soliciting and integrating suggestions for changes to TTPs, this same 
standards organization could also collect issues and suggestions concerning the terms in 
SLAs from incident handlers and relay them to contract writers for incorporation into future 
contracts within the DOD.  
Ultimately, it is imperative that all entities affected by a given SLA are familiar 
with the SLA terms and procedural applicability to avoid potential friction when in the 
process of handling an incident. It is either the priority or responsibility of incident handling 
personnel to decipher the intricacies of a given SLA involving contracted support while 
attempting to resolve an incident. Therefore, it is imperative that organizational leadership 
implement policy and safeguards that make interactions between incident handling teams 
and contracted support as seamless and unambiguous as possible.  
In summary, organizational leadership should consider: 
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• Ensuring the details of SLAs and applicable contracts are incorporated in local 
orders, incident handling TTPs, and operating manuals in an easily digestible and 
practical way. 
• Providing a process for disseminating, updating, and inspecting the applicable 
details of SLA incorporation into local orders, incident handling TTPs, and 
operating manuals. 
• Establishing an easily accessed entity to act as an intermediary between incident 
handlers and contracted support in the case that areas of responsibility should be 
unclear to either party. 
• Establishing an easily accessed entity to solicit, collect, and convey feedback and 
suggestions about SLA terms and incorporation from incident handling personnel 
and contracted support for use in future contracts and SLAs. 
C. INCIDENT HANDLING PERSONNEL TRAINING AND 
CERTIFICATION 
On several occasions during the research, participants identified the difficulty that 
incident handling team leadership had in determining appropriate training, certification, 
and qualification requirements for incoming applicants or new servicemembers for a given 
position. Participants from the U.S. federal government especially, identified a reliance on 
an outdated certification model to measure the ability of a servicemember to take on upper-
level roles and responsibilities. Participants from both the U.S. private industry and the 
U.S. federal government agreed that static third-party certifications and advanced degrees 
have become increasingly less relevant in the constantly shifting technological 
environment for assessing the practical competency of an applicant. As technology and 
network security threats rapidly evolve, private industry participants were adamant that 
first-hand experience serves as the best measure of performance potential when assessing 
a new hire. The lack of comprehensive, effective training pipelines and solidified training 
requirements has resulted in subjective hiring qualification requirements within private 
industry and an ineffective career progression model within the DOD. These subjective 
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hiring and continuing education models result in organizational limitations and make it 
difficult for incident handlers to transition between varying sub-units within an 
organization. Skills and individual abilities prioritized by one incident handling team may 
not overlap with another, especially as processes and procedures appear to vary within the 
government’s distributed team construct. It is vital that the U.S. federal government 
establish an updated policy that details achievable, preliminary incident handling training, 
emphasizes experience, and breaks away from rigid certification requirements.  
Although an applicant’s abilities upon hiring are important, continued training and 
education are critical components to ensure the growth of an incident handler. An 
organization’s long-term training initiatives are responsible for enhancing the effectiveness 
of the incident handling team and should evolve with the threat over time. Participants from 
private industry and federal government offered that annual training plans were difficult to 
formalize and real-world exercises on live networks were too risky. These factors resulted 
in over-reliance on certifications and on the job training (OJT). While third party 
certifications and OJT can reinforce basic concepts and serve as mechanisms for continuing 
education, they should not be the only instruments for training incident handling 
professionals. Training on test networks or ideally live organizational networks should be 
incorporated in an attempt to mimic real-world incident response. The risk of potentially 
degrading a non-critical service during low-traffic hours would be significantly outweighed 
by the vital training an incident handler would receive as a result of training on the actual 
systems, applications, and network that they monitor on a daily basis. Organizations can 
overcome the risk of a potential outage by scheduling authorized service interruptions 
(ASIs) during the period of training which would inform their users of a potential outage. 
However, the likelihood of an outage being caused by incident handling training on the 
live network would be minimal as most incident handlers do not have the network 
permissions necessary to make configuration changes necessary to cause a widespread 
network outage. 
Many of these changes to training paradigms can be fixed using tools already well 
known to DOD organizations, and would simply require the application and reinforcement 
of these organic training models. Training and qualification standards models already exist 
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within the DOD, such as the Marine Corps’ Training and Readiness (T&R) model and the 
Navy’s Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS). These training regimens outline step-by-
step standardized education and apprenticeship pathways for personnel to follow in the 
course of their career progression. T&R manuals define everything from formal education 
requirements, classroom study and OTJ, to practical evaluations and competency-based 
examinations. All with the purpose of standardizing the training and qualification 
requirements for specific occupational specialties across the force. It may be beneficial to 
develop a similar T&R pipeline and associated manual for incident handling personnel. 
Like the T&R programs for other occupational specialties, the training and qualification 
requirements for the entirety of a defense incident handler’s career should be laid out in an 
incremental format that is implemented regardless of geographic or combatant command. 
Care should be taken to ensure that these training requirements are as technology-agnostic 
as possible to provide the widest applicability. This would be accomplished by focusing on 
conceptual mastery evaluated by senior incident handlers, similar to the scenario-based 
qualification board concepts used in the surface, subsurface, and aviation warfare 
communities. Additionally, the introduction of a standards organization mentioned in 
previous sections could ensure that these training requirements are updated regularly to 
reflect changes in policy and procedure as well as provide graduate-level courses for 
incident handlers to become resident experts and senior-level instructors within their local 
units, similar to the function of weapons schools implemented in other communities. These 
training standards and pipelines need not be developed entirely in-house, and it is certainly 
reasonable that qualifications outlined in T&R manuals be directly correlated to 
certifications developed in the private industry. However, the desired end-state of this T&R 
system should be that new and experienced incident handling personnel have a clear 
understanding of both short-term and long-term training and career progression pipelines, 
and that incident handlers have their education seamlessly continued and qualifications 
recognized as they transition between organizations within the DOD. 
In summary, organizational leadership should consider: 
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• Replacing rigid third-party certification guidelines resident in the DOD 8570 
training manual with new training guidelines that detail the specific and 
standardized job experience outlined in digestible T&R manuals.  
• Accepting the risk associated with training incident handlers on live networks. 
Leadership should mitigate the risk by conducting incident handler live training 
during low-traffic hours and scheduling ASIs to coincide with potential services 
outages that may be created by the training. 
• Creating qualification programs evaluated on conceptual and scenario-based 
mastery that are standardized across the force where progression can continue 
through personnel transitions. 
• Creating a training standards organization responsible for updating training and 
qualification standards and manuals and to act as a graduate-level school 
producing resident experts and senior-level instructors for local organizations. 
D. AUTOMATION 
An important theme identified during the research was the automation of incident 
monitoring, notification, and response processes. Each research participant from private 
industry and academia included elements of automation during at least one stage of the 
incident handling life cycle, while participants from the federal government were either 
still in the process of transitioning to automated incident handling practices or planning 
future implementation. During the preparation stage, several organizations from private 
industry had developed robust self-help or TIER 0 troubleshooting portals and applications 
for their users. One participant from the private industry explained that many of their TIER 
0 incidents, including password resets and software downloads, are being resolved directly 
by users interacting with an automated system. Automated TIER 0 support enabled incident 
handling personnel to focus on troubleshooting significant issues and threats impacting 
their networks. Future quantitative research that evaluates the impact that automated 
helpdesks have on the overall reduction of time-to-restoration may have practical use in 
the incident handling domain.  
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During the detection and analysis stage, active and passive network monitoring 
tools and applications are being implemented by nearly all participants from private 
industry and academia. This capability enables the automated monitoring of networks, 
systems, and business applications. Private industry has configured network devices and 
business applications in a manner that automatically alerts technicians when device or 
application suites are degraded or offline. Private industry participants also implement 
proprietary software or commercial off-the-shelf solutions from ServiceNow, PagerDuty, 
and Splunk that automatically detect anomalous activity, service degradation, and 
equipment outages. These tools automatically create trouble-tickets which detailed 
pertinent information about incidents and simultaneously notify technicians responsible for 
troubleshooting by email, telephone, and chat application. By automating the workflow 
process to include documentation, trouble-ticket creation, and notification, these tools save 
organizations a significant amount of time during the early stages of the incident handling 
process. 
During the containment, eradication, and recovery stage multiple private 
organizations had configured their networks redundantly, allowing for seamless failover 
capabilities when incidents did arise. Multiple private organizations had also configured 
their software to automatically contain or quarantine portions of their network when 
anomalous activity was detected. This capability provided security and incident handling 
professionals the time needed to perform an initial diagnosis, confirm the threat or outage, 
troubleshoot, and eradicate the issue. Conversely, several research participants from 
government organizations admitted that the majority of their incidents were being initially 
identified by users. This phenomenon resulted in a reactive vice proactive incident response 
posture that lead to a piling-up of restoration tasks in incident handling workflows. During 
the post-incident activity stage, many research participants from the private industry 
advocated for open lines of communication between the U.S. Government, law 
enforcement, and other incident response organizations. These participants suggested that 
effective information sharing relationships often resulted in robust lessons-learned 
archives. Lessons learned, when used effectively, can aid systems and network engineers 
in developing future network configurations that automatically prevent threats or restore 
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services that have been regularly experienced in the past. As explained in NIST’s Incident 
Handling Guide, incidents are not completely preventable; however, organizations must 
learn from past incidents, identify reasons for a given outage, and manage their network to 
prevent similar outages in the future.  
In summary, incident handling teams should consider: 
• Leveraging automated helpdesk technologies to include commercial-off-the-shelf 
customer relationship management tools that autonomously reconcile common 
helpdesk functions. 
• Implementing commercial off-the-shelf automated workflow solutions that 
proactively identify incidents, document incident details, create trouble-tickets, 
and notify incident handling personnel of the ongoing event. 
• Prioritizing lessons-learned documentation and information sharing that details 
threats, outages, and degradations for incorporation into planning efforts with 
systems and network engineers to prevent like-incidents in the future. 
E. COMMUNICATION WITH ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
The researchers identified a large disparity amongst U.S. private industry and 
federal government participants when it came to existing interaction and support from 
organizational leadership. Private industry participants emphasized the importance of 
communication between incident handling teams and organizational leadership in the form 
of regularly scheduled meetings, debriefs, and exercises. Several private industry 
participants had strategically placed incident handlers inside individual business units to 
serve as direct liaisons between the organization’s coordinating incident handling team and 
each business unit.  
Conversely, participants from the federal government admitted that open 
communication between incident handling teams and organizational leadership was 
lacking. Terms such as “unacceptable” and “requiring immense improvement” were used 
to describe this relationship. Without effective top-down and bottom-up interaction and 
regularly scheduled communication between executive leadership and incident handling 
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teams, organizational goals and strategy can quickly become disjointed and incoherent. 
Incident handlers from multiple organizations that support defense enterprise networks 
recognized that they had a limited understanding of critical organizational policies and the 
underlying missions they supported. One participant offered that executive leadership only 
became interested when significant issued appeared. This lack of cohesiveness can 
negatively impact the accuracy, prioritization, and categorization of outages and service 
degradations due a mission purpose mismatch. When incident handlers don’t anticipate the 
impact network systems and services have on real-world operations, the likelihood of 
handling an incident in a way that effectively supports overall mission success is unlikely. 
Executive leadership should continuously communicate with incident handling 
teams to refine system prioritization and incident categorization. These priorities change 
over time as new technologies and strategies are introduced. NIST emphasizes the 
importance of communication between business leadership and incident handling teams in 
maintaining unity of effort for the sake of mission success. Executive buy-in and support 
is necessary for incident handling teams to create effective incident handling policies that 
are widely accepted and accurately enable supported operations within an organization 
(Cichonski et al., 2012).  
In summary, organizational leadership should consider: 
• Introducing at a minimum, a weekly meeting that includes members of the 
executive leadership team and the incident handling team. 
• Placing an incident handler within each critical business unit to serve as a liaison 
between business unit leadership and the organization’s coordinating incident 
handling team. 
• Developing a policy to document and debrief high priority incidents that includes 
executive leadership in the dissemination of those debriefs. 
• Conducting semi-annual table-top exercises involving executive leadership and 
incident handling teams to validate incident response policy and procedure. These 
exercises should account for supported operations and realistic mission objectives.  
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Although this research has developed several key conclusions and 
recommendations for implementation within the incident handling community, it should 
be noted that the research model had several key limitations that may have impacted the 
suggestions made by the researchers. The research sample was limited in size to only 
thirteen participants and included only a small subset of industries. While the response 
from each organization was comprehensive, in some instances including executive 
leadership, a larger sample size would provide a better representation of the incident 
handling community. Additionally, while the questionnaire was modeled after the 
recommendations established in NIST’s incident handling guide, future research that 
focuses on an analysis of the post-incident activity stage of the incident handling life cycle 
would better serve to improve the understanding of the lessons learned process. Further 
research of post-incident activity could potentially aid internal and external information 
sharing, as well as in the development of a lessons learned collection and dissemination 
policy. Finally, the researchers focused more on the policy and processes that make up the 
incident handling life cycle and less on the new technologies that have reinvented these 
processes over the last decade. Future research that analyzes specific technologies available 
to incident handlers and the effect each system and service has on quantitative restoration 
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